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Prior to 1971, the language of ' 92A provided that Ano place shall be deemed a place of public accommodation, resort or amusement which is owned or operated by a club or institution whose products or facilities or services are available only to its members and their guests.@ (St. 1953, c. 437). In 1971, the legislature amended the language to eliminate that exemption, and in 1978, the Legislature further defined the Statute with a second amendment which specifically exempted any organization such as the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts. (St. 1978, c. 331), indicating that the Legislature understood the wide sweeping nature of the newly amended language of the Statute and thereby saw the need to protect certain organizations from the Statute=s reach.
Concord Rod & Gun, Inc. v. MCAD, 402 Mass. 716, 524 N.E.2nd 1364 (1988) further defined '92A by detailing the scrutiny applied by the Court in determining inclusion of the club within the statute. The MCAD Commissioner=s findings which were upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court, further demonstrate that the legislature clearly intended to provide that the antidiscrimination statute should apply to some membership clubs that were previously viewed as private.
The words Public Accommodations came under the scrutiny of the Courts when Donna Page, a female, filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), seeking enforcement of G.L. c. 272 '' 92A and 98, and G.L. c.151B [3], against the Concord Rod and Gun Club. In 1980, Donna Page applied for membership and was denied solely on the basis of sex. As a result, she filed an action with the MCAD, requesting that the Club provide her with a full membership, and afford her the same benefits of membership as enjoyed by male members.
After full hearing at the MCAD level, the Commissioner issued findings and an order requiring the Club to admit Donna Page and also to afford females the same benefits of membership enjoyed by males.
The Club appealed, arguing that Concord Rod and Gun Club was not a place of public accommodations as defined in G.L. c. 272 '. 92A and 98, which was a threshold determination prior to the application of M.G.L.c. 151B.
The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the MCAD Commissioner=s findings, holding that the Club was, in fact, a public accommodation within the antidiscrimination provision. The Court also held that the First Amendment rights of free association of club members would not be infringed by prohibiting the club from excluding members on the basis of gender.
The SJC also upheld the Commissioners findings of the following facts relevant to the determination that the club was a place of public accommodation. |
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